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Introduction
The right to freedom of expression is essential for the protection
of rights in the Americas. It is easy
to understand that denouncing violations of human and civil rights
would not be possible without the
ability to exercise the right to free
expression, especially the right to
free speech. But, the importance of
the right to freedom of expression
goes well beyond. In fact, it can also
help prevent mass and gross violations of human rights by bringing
society’s attention to initial, isolated rights violations that, if not
properly addressed, could become
a slippery slope, leading to the destruction of democratic values.
There is a constant need for assessment and evaluation in all democratic societies. Democracy is perfectible, and ensuring a vigorous,
vibrant debate of human rights
is an essential mechanism for im-
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provement. It is necessary that
these debates focus on traditional
areas of weakness within democracies, such as the improvement
of administration of justice and
protection against discrimination.
Additionally, in an ever-changing
world, there is also need to address
new challenges, like the scope of
privacy in a world facing profound
technological development and the
eradication of corruption amidst
the challenges created by new
forms of criminality.
This article examines the role the
Inter-American System has played
in protecting the right to freedom
of expression; and, in particular the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights and American Declaration on Human Rights
by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In analyzing this
field, it is critical to understand it is
an area of constant evolution with
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ever emerging new challenges.
What remains constant is the value
of the normative process identified
in the Inter-American System. This
process relies upon the supervisory organs and their jurisprudence
to secure a realization of the right
to freedom of expression that gives
full effect to its scope and crucial
role in protecting the exercise of
every other right in a democratic
society.
I. Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Expression in
the Inter-American System
The right to freedom of expression
in the Inter-American System is
regulated by Articles 13 and 14 of
the American Convention,2 as well
as by Article 4 of the American
Declaration.3 This paper focuses on
protection of the right to freedom
of expression under the American
Convention. Several factors, however, have led to the emergence of
a unified legal regime on the right
to freedom of expression under
both the American Convention
and the American Declaration.
This is partly due to the fact that
the Convention elaborates on the
content of human rights obligations laid down by the American
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Declaration, including the right to
freedom of expression. In addition,
the interpretations and scope of
this right under both documents
are conducted by the same organ,
i.e., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. As a result,
a unified regime has emerged.
A. The Scope of Freedom of
Expression
Subsection 1 of Article 13 of the
American Convention establishes
the right of individuals to think
and express themselves freely.4 It
also details what freedom of expression means - “to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers”
- and emphasizes that the medium
used is irrelevant, as expression can
be communicated “either orally,
in writing, in print, in the form of
art, or through any other medium
of one’s choice.”5
The jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court interprets the
right to freedom of expression as
prohibiting prior censorship and
authorizing only the subsequent
imposition of liability, except in
exceptional situations laid down
by Article 13 (4) for the moral

protection of young people.6 It has
also established the scope of permissible restrictions of this right
that may apply in emergency situations.7 All forms of speech are protected by the right to freedom of
expression, including speech that
is offensive, shocking, or disturbing to the state or other groups.8
The Inter-American System has
found that freedom of expression
includes the right to denounce human rights violations by public officials.9 This highlights the connection between the Inter-American
System’s role in protecting speech
and guaranteeing access to justice,
which are both crucial to the fight
against impunity.10
The Inter-American System has
also identified three different types
of specially protected speech,11
which include:
A. political speech and speech involving matters of public interest;

B. speech regarding public officials
in the exercise of their duties and
candidates for public office;
C. speech that is an element of the
identity or personal dignity of
the person expressing herself.

“The jurisprudence of
the Commission and the
Court interprets the right to
freedom of expression as
prohibiting prior censorship
and authorizing only the
subsequent imposition of
liability, except in exceptional
situations”

These forms of specially protected
speech demonstrate the connection
existing between speech and democracy; they encourage vibrant debate. Candidates and public officials
should be subject to more public and
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voter scrutiny because they chose to
enter into the public domain. The
effort to protect speech that is connected to identity is intended to protect vulnerable groups, highlighting
the fact that democracy is strengthened when everyone in society is
heard and counts. These categories
of speech are particularly relevant
in balancing different factors when
assessing liability. Both the Commission and Court have repeatedly
affirmed that in the Inter-American
System there is a strong connection
between the right to freedom of expression and democracy.12
The interpretative work of the
Commission and the Court has
resulted in the following characteristics of the scope of freedom of expression within the context of the
Inter-American System:
A. special dual character;
B. indivisibility of expression and
dissemination of ideas;
C. multiplicity of forms of expression;
D. protection of the means required
to disseminate ideas;
E. protection of reproduction of
expression;
F. exclusion of direct and indirect
restrictions; and

310 . Curso de Derecho Internacional

The Legal Regime of
Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Expression

G. incompatibility of public and private monopolies in information
media with the right to freedom
of expression.
1. Special Dual Character
Freedom of expression possesses a
special dual character in that it not
only involves the right of individuals to express themselves, but also
the right to receive information and
ideas.13 Thus, as the Court explains
in its Advisory Opinion OC-05/85,
a violation of the right to freedom
of expression not only infringes on
an individual right, but also on “a
collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have
access to the thoughts expressed by
others.”14
The Court advanced this interpretation in the case The Last Temptation of Christ, where it held “freedom of expression is a way of
exchanging ideas and information
between persons; it includes the
right to try and communicate one’s
point of view to others, but it also
implies everyone’s right to know
opinions, reports, and news.”15
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru
case expands on this dual charac-

ter. The case was initiated when
the Peruvian government deprived
the majority shareholder and director of the Peruvian television
channel Frecuencia Latina-Canal 2
(Latin Frequency-Channel 2) of his
Peruvian nationality. The government’s action was in retaliation for
the channel’s broadcast of various
reports of human rights violations
committed by the Fujimori regime
in Peru during 1990-2000.16
Because foreigners could not own
television or radio stations in Peru,
the removal of Ivcher-Bronstein’s
Peruvian citizenship resulted in his
forced withdrawal from the directorship of the channel. The new
owners fired the journalists who
produced the programs and ceased
the broadcast of negative news
about the regime.17 While litigating
this case, the Commission asserted
that the social character of the right
to freedom of expression was much
broader than its individual aspects;

it protects all those who seek out
and receive information or opinions emitted by the media.18 In this
case, the Commission argued, and
the Court upheld, that all of society
is victimized when an individual’s
freedom of expression is violated.19
The Commission has had several opportunities to discuss this
characteristic further. In the case
of Martorell v. Chile, where censorship of the book Impunidad
Diplomática (Diplomatic Impunity) was at issue, the Commission asserted that, “arbitrary interference
that infringes this right affects not
just the individual right to express
information and ideas but also the
right of the community as a whole
to receive information and ideas of
all kinds.”20
The Commission expanded upon
this interpretation in Oropeza v.
Mexico. In this case, a Mexican journalist was allegedly assassinated for
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criticizing government authorities
in his newspaper column, which
included references to links between the police and drug trafficking.21 The Commission affirmed
that freedom of expression is a
universal legal concept in which
individuals are able to express,
transmit, receive, and disseminate
thoughts.22 Accordingly, both the
Commission and the Court have
consistently reaffirmed the dual
character of the right of freedom of
expression.
Unfortunately, the most brutal
form of silencing freedom of expression, the killing of journalists,
continues to exist in the region.
According to the most recent report of the Special Rapporteur of
Freedom of Expression, 22 journalists and other media workers
were killed in 2017, and several
others were disappeared or dislocated.23 The Special Rapporteur expressed concern that these acts of
violence against journalists had a
chilling effect on both the individual reporting of journalists that felt
threatened and entire media outlets that chose to abandon coverage or avoid sensitive areas.24 This
chilling effect can produce zones
of silence and ultimately result in
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an under-informed public. These
“zones of silence” would seem to
undermine the “collective right to
receive any information” expounded in Advisory Opinion OC-05/85.

freedom of expression, the State
must not only protect the individual expression itself, but also its
dissemination “through whichever
appropriate medium.”29

2. Indivisibility of Expression
and Dissemination of Ideas

The Commission took an analogous approach in Martorell v. Chile,
where it stated that “the decision to
ban the entry, circulation, and distribution of the book Impunidad
Diplomática in Chile violates the
right to impart information and
ideas of all kinds,”30 protected under the right to freedom of expression.

In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85,
the Court defined the scope of indivisibility of expression and dissemination, stating: “restrictions
that are imposed on dissemination
represent . . . a direct limitation on
the right to express oneself freely.”25 Furthermore, it asserted the
importance of the legal rules applicable to the press derives from this
concept.26 Finally, it added that “[f]
or the average citizen it is just as
important to know the opinions of
others or to have access to information generally as is the very right to
impart his own opinions.”27
The Court had an opportunity to
expand on this issue in Palamara
Iribarne v. Chile. In that case, the
Chilean government seized and
destroyed all hard and electronic
copies of the book Ethics and Intelligence Services and prohibited
its distribution.28 The Court held
that, in guaranteeing the right to

Similarly, in Miranda v. Mexico, the
Commission found the failure to
investigate and punish the mastermind behind the assassination of
a journalist constituted an illegal
interference with the right of every citizen to “receive information
freely and to learn the truth about
the events that took place.”31 In this
case, the co-director of a Mexican
weekly publication was assassinated
for authoring and publishing opinions critical of the government.32
As these cases demonstrate, the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American System has strongly upheld the
indivisibility of expression and dissemination of ideas.

The Legal Regime of
Protection of the Right
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3. Multiplicity of Forms of
Expression
The right to freedom of expression
is not limited to verbal expression;
all types of expression are protected, including silence.33 This right
also extends to expression in the
form of protest.34

“The right to freedom of
expression is not limited to
verbal expression; all types
of expression are protected,
including silence. This right
also extends to expression in
the form of protest.”
The Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Republic
of Argentina case is an example of
the broad scope of the right to freedom of expression developed by
the Inter-American jurisprudence.
In 1976, the Argentine military
dictatorship promulgated Decree
No. 1867/76, which prohibited
the public exercise of the Jehovah’s
Witness religion in Argentina.35
The government alleged that this
religion was based on principles
contrary to the Argentine nationality and basic State institutions.36
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As a result of the decree, followers of the religion were persecuted.37 More than 300 children were
expelled from school after being
accused of refusing to swear allegiance to the country or to sing
the Argentine National Anthem.38
The students opted instead for silence because their religion prohibited them from engaging in such
veneration of national symbols.39
Pursuant to Resolution No. 02/79,
the Commission condemned of the
Argentine government’s action,
which it considered to be responsible for the alleged violations.40

“As exemplified by the
Commission’s resolution in the
Jehovah’s Witnesses case, all
forms of expression, including
silence, are protected under
the right to freedom of
expression. With this in mind,
the attention drawn to the
issue of unlawful quelling
or regulating of protests in
some states in the region by
the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression in his
latest report, is very troubling.”
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As exemplified by the Commission’s resolution in the Jehovah’s
Witnesses case, all forms of expression, including silence, are protected under the right to freedom
of expression. With this in mind,
the attention drawn to the issue of
unlawful quelling or regulating of
protests in some states in the region by the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression in his latest report, is very troubling. The
Special Rapporteur received information on dozens of detentions,
threats, and aggressions committed
against journalists, protesters, and
users of social networks that reported on protests.41 As the Special
Rapporteur points out, public protest is a critical medium of expression used by groups that are marginalized or discriminated against
in traditional public forums.42
Public protest is also a medium
of expression protected under the
American Convention.
4. Protection of the Means
Necessary to Disseminate Ideas
Having asserted the right to disseminate opinions and ideas, both
the Commission and the Court determined that the American Convention provides that freedom of

thought and expression includes
the right to disseminate information and ideas by any means.43 In
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the
Court affirmed that “freedom of
expression ... cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium is deemed appropriate
to impart ideas and to have them
reach as wide an audience as possible.”44 The Commission asserted
in its complaint in the Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed
above, that the American Convention consecrates the right to
disseminate information and ideas
in an artistic form or by any other
means.45
Protection of the right to disseminate ideas was recently addressed in
the latest report of the Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Expression
where he stressed that regulations
on use of the internet needed to be
carefully calculated. The internet
clearly has a vast potential for expression, dissemination, and consumption of ideas. Accordingly, the
Special Rapporteur recommended
that in evaluating the proportionality of restrictions of freedom of
expression on the internet, “the impact that said restriction could have
on the capacity of the internet to
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guarantee and promote freedom of
expression must be weighed against
the benefits that restriction would
provide for the protection of other interests.”46 Furthermore, it is
important to stress the “benefits”
restrictions could provide must
remain grounded in international
law, including the American Convention, and it is not enough that a
government can claim a benefit of
some kind to justify restrictions.

“Having asserted the right
to disseminate opinions and
ideas, both the Commission
and the Court determined
that the American Convention
provides that freedom of
thought and expression
includes the right to
disseminate information and
ideas by any means.”
5. Protection of Reproduction of
Information
The right to freedom of expression
includes the right to reproduction
of expression originating from others. In the Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa
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Rica case, the State convicted the
petitioner on the criminal charge
of defamation based on the contents of several articles published
by the newspaper La Nación.47
These articles, which previously
appeared in the Belgian press, attributed illegal acts to Costa Rica’s
honorary representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Austria.48 Costa Rican law
required that the petitioner prove
the veracity of the facts reported
in the European press, and later reproduced in La Nación, in order to
avoid liability.49 The Court found
this standard to be incompatible
with Article 13 of the Convention
and that it “has a deterrent, chilling
and inhibiting effect on all those
who practice journalism . . . [that]
obstructs public debate on issues of
interest to society.”50
Penalizing the reproduction of information originating from third
parties, in the absence of malice or
grave negligence, would seriously
restrict the free flow of ideas in an
increasingly complex global reality where information flows from
multiple and often distant actors.
The exclusion of liability for reproducing this type of information
does not, however, imply exclud-
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ing liability of those with whom
the information originated (e.g.,
malicious statements of fact) or
the liability of those who reproduce such information with malice or grave negligence.51
6. Exclusion of Direct and
Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of
the American Convention prohibits restrictions on freedom of
expression that are carried out
by indirect means designed to impede communication.52 The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression has defined indirect
measures as those that, although
not “designed strictly speaking
to restrict the freedom of expression…[n]onetheless, in practice . . .
have an adverse impact on the free
circulation of ideas.”53 Unlike direct restrictions, these are harder
to detect and consequently, rarely
investigated.
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v.
Peru case, discussed above, provides an example of an indirect
restriction on freedom of expression. In this case, the government
did not use traditional restrictions
such as libel, contempt laws, cen-

sorship, or political persecution to
silence Bronstein. Instead, the regime stripped him of his nationality to achieve this goal.54
Since then, Inter-American jurisprudence has expanded on the concept of indirect restrictions. In the
Canese v. Paraguay case, the Commission recognized punitive measures as an indirect restriction to
freedom of expression. Mr. Canese
was a journalist who wrote about
allegations of corruption against
the powerful presidential candidate
Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Canese was
fired from the newspaper where he
worked and criminal proceedings
were brought against him. He was
sentenced to four months’ imprisonment and not allowed to leave
Paraguay. The Commission stated that “[t]he inhibiting effect of
the punitive measure can generate
self-censorship of a person who
wishes to speak out, which produces almost the same effect as direct
censorship: ‘opinions do not circulate.’”55 In that case, the Court determined “the criminal proceeding,
the consequent sentence imposed
on Canese . . . and the restrictions
to leave the country during almost
eight years and four months constituted an indirect means of restrict-
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ing his freedom of thought and
expression.”56 Using that law to
its fullest extent, the government
limited “the open debate on topics
of public interest or concern and
restricted Canese’s exercise of freedom of thought and expression to
omit his opinions for the remainder of the electoral campaign.”57
In a case addressing indirect restrictions, Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, the
Court noted there must be an actual restriction of speech in order for
a violation to occur.58 In this case,
the Court found the government
of Venezuela had not violated the
victim’s rights per se, but had failed
its obligation to protect the victim
from indirect restrictions by private actors.59
For years, the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression has also
investigated indirect means employed to restrict this right as they
emerge in the region, including
government funding and tax benefits for government-friendly media
outlets, threats of withdrawal of
required licenses and permits from
media outlets critical of the government, and the creation of new
crimes related to new media, such
as online libel, continue to persist.
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Already in the 2003 Annual Report,
the Rapporteur evaluated how the
unregulated use of official publicity could be transformed into a restriction. For example, the abuse
of funding distribution policies to
benefit those who favor the government or its agents punishes those
media agencies that seek a more
critical approach. The Rapporteur
illustrated that although “[t]here
exists no inherent right to receive
government advertising revenue.
. . [the state] cannot deny publicity income only to specific outlets
based on discriminatory criteria.”60
Unfortunately, this trend continues to be found in the Special Rapporteur’s most recent report where
he recounts complaints pertaining
to distribution of government advertising intended to punish or reward media outlets based on their
editorial positions.61 Furthermore,
the 2017 Report stressed concern
over the threatened withdrawal of
operating concessions, permits, or
licenses of critical media outlets.62
The Rapporteur reminded State
authorities of their positive duty to
build an environment of tolerance
and respect to protect the dissemination of ideas.63 Another concerning development highlighted by
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the Rapporteur is the emergence
of new crimes indirectly restricting
freedom of expression. One example is the Latoya Nugent case in Jamaica where Nugent was arrested
for naming alleged perpetrators of
sexual violence on social media, in
violation of the Cybercrimes Act.64
The Rapporteur stressed that this
type of double criminalization was
inappropriate because it allows for
aggravating circumstances relating
only to the medium used, in this
case social media.65
7. Incompatibility of Public
and Private Monopolies in
Information Media with the
Right to Freedom of Expression
Both the Court and the Commission have confirmed the existence
of public and private monopolies
impedes the dissemination of individual ideas as well as the reception
of the opinions of others. As a result, the existence of monopolies in
the media industry is inconsistent
with freedom of expression. In
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the
Court stated that “[i]t is the mass
media that make[s] the exercise of
freedom of expression a reality.”66
To ensure that this medium is not
restricted, the Court determined

there must be “a plurality of means
of communication, the barring of
all monopolies . . . and guarantees
for the protection of the freedom
and independence of journalists.”67
In Baruch lvcher-Bronstein v. Peru,
the Commission affirmed that the
free circulation of ideas is only
conceivable where there are multiple sources of information in addition to respect for the media.68 The
Commission explained that it is
not enough to guarantee the right
to establish mass media; it is also
necessary that journalists and other
professionals working in the media
have the protections necessary to
ensure they can work freely and independently in this space.69
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has stated that “assignments
of radio and television broadcast
frequencies should consider democratic criteria that guarantee equal
opportunities of access for all individuals.”70 In the most recent
report of the Special Rapporteur
of Freedom of Expression, the
Rapporteur noted that the concentration of public and private
media is still a problem in some
countries.71 The Rapporteur noted
specific complaints regarding the
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lack of recognition of the indigenous broadcasting sector in some
countries and the absence of regulatory mechanisms to ensure access
to these frequencies.72 In a further
expansion of the right of freedom
of expression, the Inter-American Court, in the case of Kimel v.
Argentina,73 stated the “plurality
of the media and the prohibition
of all types of monopolies in relation thereto, whatever be the form
they may adopt, is imperative.”74
The Court thereby established a
positive state obligation to adopt a
normative framework that would
guarantee the exclusion of monopolies in information media.
B. Prohibition of Prior
Censorship
One of the principal characteristics
of the right of freedom of expression in the Inter-American System is that it only allows for prior
censorship when used to regulate
public entertainment in order to
safeguard the morals of children
and adolescents.75 Subsection two
of Article 13 of the Convention
provides that freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior
censorship, but “shall be subject
to subsequent imposition of liabili-
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ty.”76 The Declaration of Principles
holds that direct or indirect prior
censorship restricts the free circulation of ideas and opinions, which
violates the right to freedom of expression.77

“One of the principal
characteristics of the right
of freedom of expression in
the Inter-American System is
that it only allows for prior
censorship when used to
regulate public entertainment
in order to safeguard the
morals of children and
adolescents.”
This prohibition responds to the
danger of creating filters capable
of determining what individuals
can hear, see, or read. Therefore,
the American Convention rejects
resort to justifications such as “national security”, “morality”, or
“good habits” that could easily be
used as pretexts to eliminate or encroach upon the free expression of
ideas. In the Western Hemisphere,
both the Court and the Commission have had the opportunity to

320 . Curso de Derecho Internacional

interpret the prohibition of prior
censorship including: (a) the exclusion of the defense of honor as a
basis for prior censorship; and (b)
identifying the scope of authorized
exceptions.
1. Exclusion of Defense of
Honor as a Basis for Prior
Censorship
Some state parties have used the
right to privacy found in Article
11 of the Convention78 as a basis
for restricting the right to freedom
of expression protected in Article
13. The basis of their argument is
that defense of honor should be excluded from the prior censorship
prohibition. The state of Chile, for
example, set forth this argument
in Martorell v. Chile. The Chilean
government and judiciary maintained that in the event of a conflict
between Articles 11 (right to privacy) and 13 (right to freedom of expression) of the American Convention, the former must prevail.79 In
deciding the case, the Commission
rejected this theory and advanced
its interpretation that the rights included in those two articles of the
American Convention do not present a conflict of different principles
from which one must be chosen.80

Accordingly, the Commission
quoted the European Court on
Human Rights, which, in a similar
case, considered that it was “faced
not with a choice between conflicting principles, one of which is
freedom of expression, but with a
principle of freedom of expression
that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly
interpreted.”81
The Commission reiterated this
interpretation of Article 13 in its
arguments in The Last Temptation
of Christ.82 In that case, the Chilean
government prohibited the distribution of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ,” arguing it did so to
protect the “honor and reputation
of Christ.”83 The Commission, in
turn, replied that the “honor of
the individual should be protected without prejudicing the exercise of freedom of expression and
the right to receive information.”84
The Commission argued subsequent liability is “only admissible
in a restricted way, when necessary
to ensure respect for the rights or
reputation of others.”85 In deciding the case, the Court upheld the
Commission’s reasoning and stated
the prohibition of the movie The
Last Temptation of Christ constitut-

ed prior censorship in violation of
Article 13 of the Convention.86
The Special Rapporteur acknowledged this interpretation in the
1998 report, noting that States
must respect the right to freedom
of expression when legislating the
protection of honor and dignity
contained in Article 11 of the Convention and applying domestic law
on the subject.87
2. Scope of Authorized
Exceptions
The American Convention authorizes an exception to its prohibition
of prior censorship: censorship of
public entertainment for the exclusive purpose of regulating access
to such events to protect the morals of children and adolescents.88
This exception, however, is only
permitted within the framework
of the Inter-American System if it
conforms to the requirements of:
•

•

Legality: the exception must be
authorized by law; decrees or
other administrative measures
would be insufficient.
Necessity: implies a case-by-case
evaluation of the pertinence
of the measure, taking into ac-

PARTE II . 321

Claudio Grossman

•

•

count the peculiarities of each
situation, and the lack of less
restrictive means available to
achieve the same valid purposes
in order to exclude improperly-motivated prohibitions.
Reality or Imminence: measures may be adopted in light of
actually existing conditions or
those that are certain to occur,
not mere hypothetical situations that could affect the morals
of children or adolescents (in
public entertainments).
Valid Purpose: corresponds to
cases involving children where
protection of morals is at issue.89

“The Inter-American System’s
prohibition on prior censorship
does not exclude subsequent
imposition of liability.
But when sucht liability is
disproportionate, it effectively
“gags” individuals who are
faced with the threat of serious
“retaliation” for expressing
their opinions, producing a
chilling effect for society at
large.”
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C. Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American System’s prohibition on prior censorship does
not exclude subsequent imposition
of liability. But when sucht liability is disproportionate, it effectively “gags” individuals who are faced
with the threat of serious “retaliation” for expressing their opinions,
producing a chilling effect for society at large. The American Convention sets forth specific requirements to establish the validity of
subsequent liability. These requirements have been reflected in the
jurisprudence of the Court.
One case in which the Court addressed subsequent liability is
Kimel v. Argentina.90 Kimel is an
investigative historian who published a book entitled La Masacre
de San Patricio in 1989.91 The book
analyzed the killings of five clergymen of the Palotine Order that
occurred 4 July 1976 during the
military dictatorship in Argentina.92 Kimel examined the judicial
investigation into the massacre
and referred to a judicial decision
adopted on 7 October 1977.93 He
raised questions concerning the
behavior of the federal judge in
charge of this case, alleging that

the judge complied with formal
requirements, but because of pressure from the military regime, had
not investigated the truth.94
The judge brought a criminal action
against Kimel for defamation or alternatively for “false imputation of
a publicly actionable crime,” both
of which are punishable by up to
three years in prison according to
Argentine Criminal Code.95 Kimel
was found guilty of the latter and
sentenced on 25 September 1995
to one year in prison and payment
of 20,000 pesos96 The Court found
that the sentence violated the right
to freedom of thought and expression laid down by the American
Convention.97 On the basis of
Kimel, and some other court decisions, the following requirements
for subsequent liability can be
identified:
1. legality;
2. democratic legitimacy;
3. necessity;
4. proportionality;
5. value judgments;
6. differentiation between opinions
based on facts and value judgments;
7. preclusion of liability for reproduction of information; and
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8. strict regulation of contempt
laws.
These requirements protect the
right to freedom of expression in
general, including, “those [forms of
expression] that offend, shock or
disturb the majority.”98
Moreover, in applying these requirements in a given case, special consideration must be given to protected
speech including, (a) political speech
and speech involving matters of public interest; (b) speech regarding public officials in the exercise of their
duties and candidates for public office; and (c) speech that is an element
of the identity or personal dignity of
the person expressing herself.99 This
type of speech is essential for democracy, and accordingly must be subject to rigorous scrutiny.
Unfortunately, in the 2017 Report by the Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression, criminal statutes in some countries still
criminalize speech related to public
officials and allow for the imposition of un-proportional measures
“that can have the kind of chilling
effect that is incompatible with a
democratic society.”100
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D. The Right to Access
Information
The right to access information is
fundamental to the ongoing development of democracy. It is found
in subsection one of Article 13 of
the American Convention, which
provides that the right to freedom
of expression includes the freedom
to seek out and receive information
of all kinds.101
With respect to this issue, the
Court has noted “a society that is
not well informed is not a society
that is truly free.”102 Restrictions
on access to information held by
public or private institutions (e.g.,
credit institutions) must be “judged
by reference to the legitimate needs
of democratic societies and institutions.”103 This implies the existence
of an absolute prohibition on access to information is incompatible
with the American Convention.
Although exceptions and limited
restrictions are possible (e.g., for
national security reasons), they
should be narrowly interpreted
and subject to judicial review in all
cases.
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E. Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of expression and thought in Article 13,
the American Convention provides
for a right of correction and reply
in Article 14.104 In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, the Court asserted
that these articles are inescapably
related: “in regulating the application of the right of reply or correction, the States parties must respect
the right of freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 13. They
may not, however, interpret the
right of freedom of expression so
broadly as to negate the right of reply proclaimed by Article 14(1).”105
The Court added that the right to
reply guarantees respect for freedom of expression in both its individual and shared dimensions.
In the individual dimension, the
Court recognizes that this right
“guarantees that a party injured by
inaccurate or offensive statements
has the opportunity to express his
[or her] views and thoughts about
the injurious statements.”106 The
Court further recognized this right
gives every person “the benefit of
new information that contradicts
or disagrees with the previous inaccurate or offensive statements.”107

In this respect, the rights act as a
balance of information which is
needed for the public to form a
true and correct opinion.
F. Emergency Situations and
Their Impact on Freedom of
Expression
The regulation of emergency situations is of great importance to
the protection of rights in general
and to the protection of freedom of
expression in particular. Emergency situations arise when there is a
threat against the life of the nation.
These situations permit restrictions on human rights, including
the right to freedom of expression.
The requirements prescribed by
the American Convention for the
timely suspension of rights, including freedom of expression, are:
1. necessity, there must be absolutely no other possible alternatives in
the case at hand;
2. timeliness, the suspension of
rights must be valid strictly for the
time required;
3. proportionality, measures adopted cannot be an excessive reaction
on the part of the authorities in
light of the existing emergency;
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4. compatibility, measures adopted
must be compatible with other duties imposed by international law;
5. non-discrimination; and
6. compliance with the law by the
authorities.
The temporary suspension of
rights supposes actions by authorities consistent with the law declared for reasons of general interest and for the purpose for which
they were established.108
G. The Link Between Freedom
of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commission have established that there is
an inherent link between freedom
of expression and democracy.109 In
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the
Court affirmed that “[f]reedom of
expression is a cornerstone upon
which the very existence of a democratic society rests,”110 and this
freedom is essential for the development of political parties, trade
unions, scientific and cultural societies, and those who wish to influence the public.111
As stated by the Special Rapporteur, when debate is restricted, the
development of democracy is inter-
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rupted because the free debate of
ideas and opinion among citizens is
impeded.112 The link between freedom of expression and democracy
has been part of the development
process within the context of the
OAS. Currently, only democratic States may become members
of that Organization. An important milestone in this process was
reached when OAS Resolution
1080 was adopted in Santiago,
Chile in 1991.113 It allows OAS
political organs to take active measures, including diplomatic initiatives, when the constitutional process of a country breaks down.114
The Inter-American Democratic
Charter broadens the scope of situations that would warrant OAS
actions,115 referring specifically to
freedom of expression. It was built
on the jurisprudence cited above
and determined that democracy
provides the theoretical and practical ground to guarantee freedom of
information, as a necessary structure to secure compliance with human rights.116
Conclusion
The interpretations of the American Convention by the Court and
the Commission have developed a
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normative framework designed to
protect freedom of expression in
the Inter-American System. This
framework addresses not only direct but also indirect attacks on the
right to freedom of expression, including protections for speech criticizing public officials, restrictions
on prior censorship, and positive
obligations on countries to eliminate media monopolies and ensure
a friendly environment for the dissemination of all ideas in any medium desired.

ing this right. Because of the nature
of litigation in the Inter-American
System, its jurisprudence consists
of reactions to alleged violations
of the right to freedom of expression rather than proactive steps to
promote the right. That being said,
promotional steps are essential for
the full realization of this right,
especially concerning the right of
freedom of expression of women,
LGTBQ persons, and indigenous
peoples, among others. Affirmative
steps at the state level seem to be a
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requirement in order to ensure the
ability of all persons to exercise the
right to freedom of expression.
Exercise of the right to freedom of
expression is interwoven into the
fabric of democracy and underpins
the relationship between human
rights and democracy. The inability to fully exercise the right to
freedom of expression, jeopardizes
the ability to exercise every other
human right and removes the democratic power from the people.

New forms of media and the rapid
dissemination of information have
created new challenges for states
to grapple with, especially related
to protection of privacy and new
forms of corruption. These challenges make protecting the right
to freedom of expression even
more critical to ensure the protection of other fundamental rights.
Achieving full protection of the
right to freedom of expression in
the Americas requires that states
fully comply with existing regional
norms and incorporate them into
domestic law. As the most recent
report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Freedom of Expression
shows, there is much room for improvement defending and protect-
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